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T
oday, it is widely acknowledged that the
fundamental mission of monetary policy is
to maintain the long-run stability of the
price level. Economists and policymakers generally
agree that persistent changes in the price level
(inflation and deflation) are, in the long run, caused
by growth of the money stock in excess of the
growth of total output. It is thought, moreover, that
monetary policy can best promote high employ-
ment and maximum sustainable economic growth
by maintaining reasonable stability of the price
level. The charter of the European Central Bank, as
well as legislation governing the behavior of central
banks in several countries, specifies price stability
as the sole objective for monetary policy. The
Federal Reserve, by contrast, is assigned multiple
policy objectives—“maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”
(Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977). Nevertheless,
in recent years U.S. monetary policy has been con-
sistent with a gradual reduction in the rate of infla-
tion to the point where many economists believe
that price level stability, for practical purposes, has
been achieved.
The consensus about the importance of price
level stability and the role of monetary policy is a
fairly recent development. The macroeconomic
paradigm that emerged from the Great Depression
and dominated from the 1940s to about 1980 held
that full employment should be the primary objec-
tive of monetary and fiscal policy. Stabilization
policy was viewed as choosing from among a menu
of unemployment and inflation rates along a stable
Phillips curve. Many economists and policymakers
viewed moderate inflation as an acceptable cost of
maintaining full employment. During the 1950s
the Federal Reserve frequently was criticized for
paying “excessive” attention to inflation, to the
detriment of employment and output growth.
Perhaps in part a response to such criticism, in
the early 1960s the Fed’s monetary policy generally
became more expansionary. Inflation began to rise
in 1965 and continued to increase through the
1970s. Unemployment fell at first, but during the
1970s the average rate of unemployment was higher
than it had been during the preceding two decades.
Moreover, inflation, unemployment, and real output
growth all became more variable as the average rate
of inflation increased.
Not surprisingly, the poor performance of the
macroeconomy during the 1970s brought the
Federal Reserve much criticism. Among professional
economists, once-dominant views about the roles of
monetary and fiscal policy began to shift. Experience
demonstrated the folly of those policies designed
to exploit a tradeoff between unemployment and
inflation and showed that expansionary monetary
policy could not permanently lower the unemploy-
ment rate or increase the growth rate of real output.
By October 1979, when Federal Reserve officials
finally resolved to bring inflation under control, the
costs of disinflating were substantially higher than
they would have been earlier in the decade when
inflation was lower and less entrenched. 
This paper examines alternative views about
monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. We highlight
the views of Darryl Francis, president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis from 1966 to 1975. In
contrast to most of his Fed colleagues, Francis argued
that monetary policy should concentrate on halting
inflation. He believed that the influence of monetary
policy on the unemployment rate was unpredictable
and at best temporary. He was an early proponent
of the view that the unemployment rate (and real
output growth) tends toward a “natural” rate deter-
mined by factors outside the control of monetary
policymakers. Francis argued that the Fed should
maintain a steady growth rate of the money stock
and blamed the Fed’s targeting of interest rates and
money market conditions for producing destabilizing
swings in money stock growth. 
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© 2003, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.Darryl Francis’s death in early 2002 prompted
this historical account of his policy views and the
debates within the Fed when he was president of
the St. Louis Bank.1 Reviewing the economic events
and debates of this period not only provides a better
understanding of the reasons behind the Fed’s mone-
tary policy actions, but also illuminates how policy
views within the System evolved toward recognizing
price level stability as the principal long-run objec-
tive for monetary policy. 
The next two sections set the stage for our
review of Francis’s policy positions. First we summa-
rize macroeconomic conditions from the 1950s
through the 1970s, and then we describe the develop-
ment of monetary policy from 1951 to 1966, when
Francis became president of the St. Louis Fed. The
subsequent section describes Francis’s views about
key policy issues by drawing extensively on his
speeches and remarks at Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meetings. We highlight differ-
ences between the views of Francis and the consen-
sus of his FOMC colleagues.
MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
In March 1951, the Federal Reserve and U.S.
Treasury reached an agreement (the “Accord”) that
freed the Fed from an obligation to maintain specific
yield ceilings on U.S. government securities. The
agreement was sparked by a sharp increase in the
rate of inflation in 1950 and early 1951 and the
desire of Fed officials to halt the rise by limiting the
growth of bank reserves and the money stock. Under
the Accord the Fed agreed to continue to support
the government securities market temporarily when
the Treasury issued new debt, but yields were per-
mitted to find their market levels as the Fed directed
its focus toward containing inflation.
Inflation declined sharply in 1952 and remained
low until 1956, as Figure 1 shows. After reaching
an annual rate of nearly 4 percent in 1957, inflation
declined to under 2 percent and remained remark-
ably steady until 1965. The rate of inflation then
began to move upward in successive waves, with
peaks in 1970, 1974, and 1980. Each peak came
during a recession and followed deliberate actions
by the Federal Reserve to tighten policy. In each
successive cycle, however, the inflation nadir and
subsequent peak were higher than those associated
with the previous cycle. In 1980 the consumer price
index increased at a 13.5 percent annual rate, its
highest annual rate since 1947 when wartime price
controls had just been lifted.
We plot the unemployment rate over the same
years in Figure 2. The unemployment rate fluctuated
considerably during the 1950s, then fell almost
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1 We focus on Francis’s professional contributions. For more personal
reflections, see Poole (2001, 2002) and Jordan (2001).
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NOTE: Shaded bars represent recessions.continuously from 1963 to 1969 to end the decade
below 4 percent. Much of the decline came as infla-
tion was rising, suggesting that Federal Reserve
officials had revised their preferences in favor of a
lower unemployment rate and were willing to accept
higher inflation as the cost of pushing the unemploy-
ment rate down.
The unemployment rate did not continue to
fall during the 1970s, even though inflation con-
tinued to rise. As Figure 2 shows, the unemploy-
ment rate increased sharply during the recession
of 1970; though it declined during the subsequent
recovery, it did not fall below 5 percent. Another
recession in 1974-75 pushed the unemployment
rate above 8 percent. In the subsequent recovery,
the rate again fell to a low point that was higher
than that of the previous expansion. Finally, during
the 1981-82 recession the unemployment rate
peaked at over 10 percent—its highest level since
the Great Depression.
Although short-run peaks in the unemployment
rate tended to occur when the inflation rate was
falling, the negative correlation between annual
rates of unemployment and inflation that character-
ized the 1960s was absent during the 1970s and
early 1980s. As shown in Figure 3, unemployment
and inflation rates appear to have followed a pre-
dictable Phillips curve pattern—higher unemploy-
ment rates associated with lower inflation—during
the 1960s. From 1970 to 1982, however, the corre-
lation between unemployment and inflation rates
was low. Moreover, both rates followed upward
trends over the period, which ran counter to a view
commonly held during the 1960s that expansionary
monetary policy could permanently lower the aver-
age rate of unemployment.2
It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify
the sources of specific changes in inflation or
unemployment during the 1960s and 1970s. Oil
price shocks in 1973 and 1979 and other supply-
side disturbances are often blamed for much of the
adverse movements in unemployment and the price
level during the 1970s.3 The increasing trend rate
of inflation is today widely attributed to a rising
average growth rate of the money stock. The associ-
ation between money stock growth and inflation is
illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot the growth rate
of M1, a narrow monetary aggregate, alongside the
inflation rate.4 The figure illustrates that money
growth and inflation moved inversely in the short
run, reflecting the Fed’s attempts to tighten policy
in response to higher inflation. Over the longer term,
however, the upward trend in the rate of inflation
was associated with a similar trend in money stock
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2 Hafer and Wheelock (2001) provide a summary of alternative views
during the 1960s about the association between inflation and unem-
ployment in the long run.
3 See Barsky and Kilian (2001) for an alternative view.
4 We plot M1 growth because it was the aggregate favored by Darryl
Francis and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis staff. M2 growth behaved
similarly, however, during the period illustrated here.
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Inflation Rate and M1 Growth
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Inflation
M1growth. Like inflation and unemployment, M1
growth rose and fell in waves, with both growth rate
peaks and troughs as high or higher than those of
the previous cycle.
MONETARY POLICY FROM THE
ACCORD TO 1966
We assert that neither the trend nor the variabil-
ity of money stock growth, inflation, or the unem-
ployment rate during the late 1960s and the 1970s
reflected a well-designed monetary policy. To provide
some information on how policy decisions were
made during these years, we briefly review econ-
omic policy developments in the period preceding
the “Great Inflation” of 1966-80.
During the 1950s, monetary policy focused
largely on the threat of inflation. Inflation fell sharply
in 1952 when the Fed began to exercise its new inde-
pendence. Following the 1953-54 recession, however,
inflation seemed poised to increase again. Federal
Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin
vowed not to repeat the mistake of the previous
expansion, when interest rates were not increased
fast enough to curb inflation. Consequently, the Fed
tightened policy in 1956 and maintained its stance
even as economic activity began to slow. Although
a few FOMC members called for an easier policy,
the majority thought that continued restraint was
needed to avoid “sloppy” financial markets and to
contain inflationary momentum.5
The Fed’s concern about potential inflationary
momentum was heightened in 1957 when, contrary
to widespread expectations, the price level failed to
decline as economic activity began to slow.6 The
Fed maintained its anti-inflation posture until mid-
1958, easing only when policymakers had become
convinced that inflation was falling. M1 growth
exceeded 6 percent during the final two quarters of
1958 after having fallen at about a 2 percent annual
rate during the first half of that year. Monetary policy
remained expansionary until late 1959 when a
tighter policy caused M1 growth to fall. The economy
entered yet another recession in the second quarter
of 1960. 
Even though inflation had remained low, slow
economic growth and recurrent recessions—1953-
54, 1957-58, and 1960-61—led  to criticism of the
Fed’s policies. One group of economists—who were
later labeled “monetarists”—blamed the Fed’s “stop-
go” policy actions, and resulting swings in money
stock growth, for much of the instability in the
macroeconomy.7 Other economists claimed that
persistently tight monetary policy had contributed
to the economy’s tepid growth and high unemploy-
ment, though many considered monetary policy
less effective than fiscal policy for stabilizing econ-
omic activity.
The principal economic advisors in the Kennedy
administration were prominent Keynesians who
favored the use of fiscal policy tools to stimulate
rapid economic growth.8 In the Kennedy adminis-
tration, writes Okun (1970, pp. 40-41), “the standard
for judging economic performance [focused on]
whether the economy was living up to its potential
rather than merely whether it was advancing…As
long as the economy was not realizing its potential,
improvement was needed and government had a
responsibility to promote it.” 
The Economic Report of the President for 1962
outlined the problem as Kennedy’s advisors saw it:
“Expectations in 1962 were colored by the suspicion
that underutilization was to be the normal state of
the American economy…[and] inadequate demand
remains the clear and present danger to an improved
economic performance” (1963, p. 23). The Report
stated explicitly that “demands originating in the
private economy are insufficient by themselves to
carry us to full employment…[and] the Federal
Government can relax its restraints on the expan-
sionary powers of the private economy” by reduc-
ing taxes and reforming the tax system (1963, p. 32). 
Where did monetary policy fit into this scheme?
The consensus view, both outside and inside the Fed,
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7 The FOMC focused on interest rates and free reserves (i.e., excess less
borrowed reserves), not money stock growth, in its policy deliberations.
When the Fed desired a tighter policy, it would use open market oper-
ations to reduce (or limit the growth of) bank free reserves to increase
the market yields on Treasury securities. Similarly, to ease monetary
policy, the Fed would increase free reserves to reduce market yields.
Friedman (1960) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964), among others, argued
that this approach caused undesirable swings in money stock growth
that interfered with the Fed’s ability to achieve the broad policy objec-
tives of price stability, low unemployment, and economic growth. 
8 The belief that fiscal policy was a potent tool in economic stabilization
was not confined to the White House. Fed Chairman Martin (1961,
p. 279), testified to the Joint Economic Committee on March 7, 1961,
that in the fight against inflation “undue reliance has perhaps been
placed on monetary policy. I can readily agree with those who
would have fiscal policy…carry a greater responsibility for combating
inflation.”
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5 Stein (1969) notes that the Fed was supported in its policy by the
Eisenhower administration and by many in the academic community.
6 The business cycle peaked in August 1957, and the downturn contin-
ued to April 1958. A common view at the time was that this recession
was “only an interruption in the inflationary pressure, and the fact
that it did not result in any decline of the price indexes was considered
highly ominous” (Stein, 1969, p. 319).was that monetary policy should accommodate
the needs of fiscal policy, which meant keeping
interest rates low. Although nominally constrained
by the continuing balance of payment deficits,
monetary policy was generally consistent with the
Kennedy administration’s desires. Okun (1970, p. 55)
writes that “the Fed did not ‘lean against the wind’
during 1961-65. As long as the economy continued
to operate below its potential and prices remained
stable, the Fed was prepared to provide the liquidity
to sustain the advance.”9
Extended summaries of the FOMC Memoranda
of Discussion corroborate Okun’s view, although
there probably was more concern expressed about
a possible resurgence of inflation in FOMC deliber-
ations than in White House meetings. For example,
at an FOMC meeting on December 17, 1963, Federal
Reserve Chairman Martin commented that the
“whole western world was again faced with the
specter of inflation…and he was opposed to infla-
tion because it led to deflation. There were those
who believed that unemployment could be cured
by easy money. He doubted this…Budget, fiscal
and wage-price policies had more fundamental
effects” ( FOMC, December 17, 1963, p. 55-56).10
The Phillips curve was cemented firmly into
the policy calculus of administration advisors and
many Federal Reserve economists.11 Using this
framework, the president’s advisors estimated that
if the economy were operating at its potential, the
unemployment rate would be approximately 4
percent and the inflation rate would be about 2
percent.12 Fiscal and monetary policies were not
considered adequately expansionary if the unem-
ployment rate rose above 4 percent.
After declining steadily since 1961, full employ-
ment (i.e., a 4 percent unemployment rate) was
achieved in 1965. Although many economists and
policymakers recognized that expansionary policies
could lead to higher inflation, consumer price infla-
tion appeared to be contained. Wholesale prices,
however, began to rise rapidly in 1965. With federal
budget deficits also expanding, fears of higher infla-
tion were ignited. Nevertheless, by September 1965,
Fed Chairman Martin opined that price pressures
were not sustainable and that “it would be desirable
to keep to the status quo, with the [Open Market]
Desk maintaining market conditions on as even a
keel as possible at this juncture” (FOMC, September
28, 1965, p. 94).
Martin’s views changed quickly. Inflation
became more apparent as 1965 was drawing to a
close. Despite pressure from the White House, Martin
and other Fed officials began to advocate a more
restrictive policy.13 Martin stated at an FOMC meet-
ing in late November that “if any Reserve Bank
should come in with an increase in the discount rate
he would be prepared to approve” (FOMC, November
23, 1965, p. 87). On December 6, 1965, the discount
rate was increased from 4 to 4.5 percent. The Board
of Governors was deeply divided over the increase—
four members voted to approve the increase and
three opposed. The Johnson administration and
some members of Congress were publicly critical
of the Fed’s move, with some administration officials
even questioning whether the Fed should have the
power to act independently.14
Foreshadowing later episodes, the Fed’s effort
to contain inflation was short-lived. Monetary policy
tightened further in mid-1966, but the Fed soon
relented under pressure that intensified when
interest-sensitive sectors of the economy began to
show signs of weakness. By early 1967 monetary
policy, as measured by the growth of monetary
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13 St. Louis Fed president Harry Shuford, Francis’s predecessor, argued
for monetary restraint at an FOMC meeting on November 2, 1965. He
and a few others recognized that “The economy was operating near
capacity, and at this time the rate of increase in spending appeared
to be faster than the growth in ability to produce” (FOMC, 1965, p. 23).
Fed Governor Charles Shepardson concurred, stating that “the rate of
recent expansion was unsustainable, and at some point steps must
be taken to try to dampen it” (FOMC, 1965, p. 34).
14 For example, Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, argued that “The Federal Reserve System is part of the govern-
ment, and should be responsible to the administration” (cited in Hetzel,
1995, p. 19).
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9 The March 26, 1963, FOMC meeting, which ended in agreement to
not change course, produced a policy directive that is representative
of the times: “This policy [to accommodate moderate growth in bank
credit and minimize capital outflows] takes into account the continuing
adverse United States balance of payments position and the increases
in bank credit, money supply, and the reserve base in recent months,
but at the same time recognizes the limited progress of the domestic
economy, the continuing underutilization of resources, and the absence
of general inflationary pressures” (FOMC, 1963, p. 47).
10 The Memoranda of Discussion are not verbatim transcripts of FOMC
meetings, but rather summaries of statements made by meeting
participants.
11 Some administration advisors helped develop the Phillips curve for
policy use. See, for example, Samuelson and Solow (1960). See Taylor
(1997) for a discussion of how use of the Phillips curve led to an infla-
tion bias in policy. 
12 See Hetzel (1995) for additional detail. The impression one gets from
interviews with former Fed officials is that the FOMC did not explicitly
use the Phillips curve in its discussions. Still, the policy discussion
available in the FOMC Memoranda of Discussion suggests that such a
tradeoff was recognized and affected policy decisions. See Mayer
(1995, 1999).aggregates, had once again become extremely
expansionary.15
THE FRANCIS YEARS
Darryl Francis became president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis in 1966. In the tradition
of his predecessors, he was an outspoken critic of
the Fed’s monetary policies.16 Francis strongly
supported the goal of halting inflation, but felt that
the Fed’s actions in late 1965 and early 1966 had
been too timid. At an FOMC meeting on May 10,
1966, he noted that the monetary aggregates were
continuing to grow rapidly, which he attributed to
the Fed’s reluctance to allow interest rates to rise.
At the subsequent FOMC meeting on June 28, he
pointed out that “while it was generally believed
that interest rates had been rising in a restrictive
manner during the past year, they had, in a very
real sense, not done so. The cost of money to the
borrower and the return to the saver were affected
by changes in the value of the dollar. When one
adjusted market interest rates for the decline in the
value of the dollar [i.e., for inflation]…one found
that interest costs had not risen at all in the past
year…During the year market interest rate increases
had provided no restriction to the excessive total
demand” (FOMC, June 28, 1966, p. 65).
Measured by Francis’s preferred gauge of mone-
tary policy—the growth of monetary aggregates—
policy became considerably tighter as 1966
progressed. By autumn, Francis voiced concerns that
monetary policy had become too tight: “Monetary
developments since last spring had been restrictive…
Member bank reserves had declined moderately,
growth of bank credit had slowed markedly, and
the money supply had changed little on balance…
Care now had to be taken to avoid becoming too
restrictive…Steps should be taken to avoid any
sustained monetary contraction, as well as to avoid
a renewal of the rapid monetary expansion that
occurred last winter and spring” (FOMC, November 1,
1966, pp. 78-79).
Francis’s statements at FOMC meetings during
his first year in office reflected  fundamental views
about monetary policy that he shared with other
monetarists. The quotes above, for example, illus-
trate his belief that the stance of monetary policy
is measured appropriately by the growth rates of
monetary aggregates, not the level of interest rates,
and that the Fed should keep the money stock grow-
ing at a steady pace, rather than allow it to fluctuate
widely. His calls for targeting the money stock growth
rate and for focusing monetary policy exclusively
on containing inflation, while gaining some support
in academic circles, put him at odds with most of
his Fed colleagues. In this section, we examine
Francis’s policy pronouncements in detail and how
they challenged the prevailing consensus among
Federal Reserve policymakers.17
Monetary Policy and Employment
Many of Francis’s policy views would not be
controversial today, but fell outside the mainstream
during his tenure at the Fed. For example, a dominant
view among macroeconomists at that time was
that the government should respond to any short-
falls in employment or output growth. The Fed was
widely accused of having been overly concerned
with preventing inflation during the 1950s, which
many economists claimed had kept the unemploy-
ment rate higher than necessary.18 Although reason-
able stability of the price level was seen as desirable,
many economists and policymakers argued that
modest inflation was an acceptable cost of achieving
high employment. Moreover, many claimed that
any inflation that did occur when the economy
was at less than full employment was due not to
monetary policy but to “excessive” increases in
wages or other costs. 
Although widely held, the mainstream views
about inflation and the role of monetary policy did
not go unchallenged. Friedman (1968) and Phelps
(1967) argued that the unemployment rate would
tend toward a “natural rate” in the long run, irrespec-
tive of the rate of inflation. Friedman preached that
“inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon” and argued that fluctuations in
money stock growth historically had been a principal
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17 Although Francis’s intellectual debt to his research staff and others
should not be ignored, it was Francis who advocated these unpopular
ideas and new research results in FOMC policy discussions and public
venues.
18 For example, see the views expressed by participants in a symposium
on (then) recent monetary policy in the Review of Economics and
Statistics (1960).
Hafer and Wheelock R EVIEW
15 See Cagan (1972) for a detailed discussion of monetary policy during
this period.
16 Francis’s predecessors at the St. Louis Bank, Delos Johns and Harry
Shuford, also argued for the use of monetary aggregates in the conduct
and description of policy. This tradition no doubt reflected the influ-
ence of Homer Jones, who was the director of research at the St. Louis
Fed from 1958-71. Jones’s influence is examined in a special volume
of the Journal of Monetary Economics (1976).cause of short-run fluctuations in real output and
employment. By fixing money stock growth at the
long-run growth rate of real output (adjusted for the
trend growth of velocity), Friedman claimed that the
price level would remain stable and monetary policy
would not contribute to business cycle fluctuations.19
Francis shared many of Friedman’s views and
advocated them in policy discussions. Francis decried
attempts to use monetary policy to control the
unemployment rate, claiming that “Use [of monetary
policy] as a short-run stabilizing tool produces costs
in terms of lost employment and output and unde-
sired price level movements” (1972, p. 34). Further,
he argued, “I am convinced that future stabilization
of our economy depends heavily upon a moderate
and stable growth of the money stock. But if the
pronouncements of critics of the monetarist view
are heeded, the result will most likely be erratic
fluctuations in the money stock caused by attempts
to ‘fine tune’ the economy. Such fluctuations will
necessarily cause periods of inflation and will be
frequently accompanied by unacceptable levels of
unemployment” (1972, p. 38). In Francis’s view,
“stop-go” monetary policy, by which he meant abrupt
shifts from slow to rapid growth of the money stock,
was an important cause of fluctuations in output
growth and inflation: “Only by eliminating the stop-
go stabilization actions…could [monetary] policy
makers permanently improve the total social welfare
and avoid acting as the architects of successive
waves of intensifying inflation and recession” (FOMC,
April 6, 1971, pp. 77-78).
Today, Francis might be described as an inflation
“hawk” because he often argued that monetary
growth was too fast and inflation too high. In the
fall of 1966 and again in October 1969, however,
Francis pressed for an easier monetary policy
because he believed that monetary growth was too
slow and the danger of recession was high. On the
latter occasion he argued that “The studies made
at his Bank indicated…that, if the System did not
permit some growth in key monetary aggregates
beginning now, an unacceptable economic recession
would most likely develop in 1970, which in turn
might force the Committee into [an] inordinate
monetary expansion” (FOMC, October 28, 1969,
pp. 54).20 Francis was prescient: The U.S. econ-
omy entered a recession in the fourth quarter of
1969.
Francis attributed the increasing trend rate of
inflation that began in the mid-1960s to the Fed’s
persistent attempts to hold the unemployment rate
below a level consistent with price stability. At the
time, the consensus among most policymakers and
economists was that a 4 percent unemployment
rate represented full employment. In hindsight, it
is now widely believed that the “natural rate” was
really 5 percent or higher throughout the 1970s.21
Even though Francis probably had no more insight
about the natural rate of unemployment than any
other Fed policymaker, as early as 1970 he ques-
tioned whether a 4 percent rate of unemployment
could be achieved without generating higher infla-
tion: “When spending was rising fast enough to keep
the unemployment rate at about 4 percent, strong
upward pressure was exerted on prices and price
expectations…Much of the current unemployment
was structural and could not be obviated except
temporarily and with adverse price effects by stimu-
lation of total spending” (FOMC, August 18, 1970,
pp. 44-45). In 1971 he again noted that “In the last
decade whenever the unemployment rate had been
below 5 percent inflation had accelerated, largely
because of labor market imperfections” (FOMC,
April 6, 1971, p. 30).
The Cause or Causes of Inflation
Friedman and other monetarists believed that
the impact of monetary policy on real output and
employment was transitory: Over time, monetary
policy affected only the price level, while sustained
movements in the price level were caused solely by
growth of the money stock in excess of total output
growth. At the time, however, many economists and
policymakers attributed inflation to imperfections
in labor or product markets, expansionary fiscal
policy, shortages of raw materials, and other non-
monetary forces. Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur
Burns, for example, blamed the inflation of the 1970s
on increases in wages and other costs in excess of
productivity gains. In a speech given in December
1970, Burns complained that “Governmental efforts
to achieve price stability continue to be thwarted
by the continuance of wage increases substantially
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that productivity growth had slowed substantially in the late 1960s
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research results produced by his research staff. Of these, perhaps the
most controversial was that of Andersen and Jordan (1968).in excess of productivity gains…The inflation that
we are still experiencing is no longer due to excess
demand. It rests rather on the upward push of
costs—mainly, sharply rising wage rates.” He argued,
moreover, that “Monetary and fiscal tools are inade-
quate for dealing with sources of price inflation
such as are plaguing us now—that is pressures on
costs arising from excessive wage increases” (Burns,
1978, pp. 112-13).22
Burns often made similar comments at FOMC
meetings. For example, at a meeting on April 7, 1970,
he suggested that “The inflation that was occurring—
and that was now being accentuated…was of the
cost-push variety. That type of inflation…could not
be dealt with successfully from the monetary side
and it would be a great mistake to try to do so”
(FOMC, April 7, 1970, p. 50). Whereas Burns viewed
wage increases as the dominant cause of inflation
during the 1970s, he blamed expansionary fiscal
policy for the initial increase in inflation during
the mid-1960s: “The current inflationary problem
emerged in the middle 1960s when our government
was pursuing a dangerously expansive fiscal policy
…Our underlying inflationary problem…stems in
very large part from loose fiscal policy” (Burns, 1978,
p. 177).23
Francis disagreed. Unlike some of his contem-
poraries on the FOMC, Francis did not confuse
changes in relative prices with persistent increases
in the general level of prices. While monetary policy
could affect the latter, changes in relative prices
were caused by market forces beyond the Fed’s
control. In a February 1972 speech, for example,
Francis argued that “In the long run the growth of
output and employment is determined by the growth
of resources of a society…The trend growth of prices
is determined by the trend growth of money stock
relative to growth in output…Deviations from a
trend rate of growth of money…cause short-run
deviations in output and employment…But once
the adjustment is completed, output and employ-
ment will resume their longer-run growth paths”
(Francis, 1972, p. 33). In another speech, Francis
noted that “other factors have an influence on the
movement of prices in a given year. But when we
talk about the ‘problem of inflation,’ I think it is
safe to say that the fundamental cause is excessive
money growth” (Francis, 1974, pp. 6-7).24 As a policy
issue, the distinction between changes in relative
prices and inflation became even more important
when petroleum prices increased sharply in 1973.
The Cure for Inflation
In light of their differing views about the cause
of inflation, not surprisingly Burns and Francis dis-
agreed about how to end inflation. By the late 1960s
inflation clearly was on an upward trend. As Francis
pointed out in early 1969, “For about four years…
the [Federal Open Market] Committee had been led
into unintended inflationary monetary expansion
while following interest rate, net reserves, and bank
credit objectives and the even keel constraint. He
suggested that, if the Committee meant business
now, it should try some other guides” (FOMC,
February 4, 1969, p. 47). Specifically, Francis sought
an operating procedure that focused on controlling
the growth of money. His view, from which he did
not waver during his ten years on the FOMC, was
that “the cure [for inflation] is to slow down the rate
of money expansion” (Francis, 1974, p. 7).
In contrast, Burns, other members of the FOMC,
and administration economists promoted wage and
price controls as the only viable policy for stopping
inflation. “The persistence of rapid advances of
wages and prices in the United States and other
countries, even during periods of recession,” Burns
argued, “has led me to conclude that governmental
power to restrain directly the advance of prices and
money incomes constitutes a necessary addition to
our arsenal of economic stabilization weapons”
(Burns, 1978, p. 156).25 At an FOMC meeting on
June 8, 1971, Burns argued that “Monetary policy
could do very little to arrest an inflation that rested
so heavily on wage-cost pressures...A much higher
rate of unemployment produced by monetary policy
would not moderate such pressures appreciably...He
intended to continue to press [the administration]
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24 Even though Burns later admitted that “Inflation cannot continue
indefinitely without an accommodating increase in supplies of money
and credit” (Burns, 1978, p. 208), he argued that inflation could con-
tinue well after monetary stimulus was removed, even during a period
of rising unemployment: In 1971 he argued that “inflation caused by
excess demand became entrenched, and remained after demand-side
pressures abated. Entrenched inflation, increased militancy of labor,
and willingness of business to accede to labor’s wage demands,
explains continued rising prices during periods of rising unemploy-
ment” (Burns, 1978, p. 126). Burns made this statement in a speech
titled “The Economy in Mid-1971,” given July 23, 1971.
25 Burns made this statement in a speech titled “Some Problems of
Central Banking,” given June 6, 1973.
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22 Burns made these statements in a speech titled “The Basis for Lasting
Prosperity,” given December 7, 1970.
23 Burns made this statement in a speech titled “Key Issues of Monetary
Policy,” given July 30, 1974. hard for an effective incomes policy” (FOMC, June
8, 1971, p. 51). On August 15 of that year, President
Nixon unveiled his New Economic Program and
introduced the first of three phases of direct wage
and price controls.
Francis was highly critical of government con-
trols on prices and wages, as they simply disrupted
market signals. At an FOMC meeting in December
1967, he suggested that “Selective credit controls,
wage freezes, and price restrictions had been advo-
cated as alternatives [to contain inflation]. Such
controls, however…raised problems of resource
allocation; they interfered with freedom; and they
were difficult to administer” (FOMC, December 12,
1967, pp. 54-55). In December 1970, Francis again
argued at an FOMC meeting that “The adoption of
administrative controls in attempting to hold down
inflation, or to shorten the period of adjustment,
would impose a great cost on the private enterprise
economy. Serious inefficiencies would develop in the
operations of the market system” (FOMC, December
15, 1970, p. 74). While such controls might mask
inflation for a time, “a freeze or other control pro-
grams could not be expected to effectively restrain
inflation unless accompanied by sound monetary
actions” (FOMC, October 19, 1971, p. 36). In
Francis’s view, low rates of inflation could not be
achieved over the long run unless the money stock
grew at a rate approximately equal to the long-run
growth rate of real economic activity. Wage and
price controls, to Francis, were merely impediments
to the efficient working of a free market.
Money Versus the Money Market
The money stock did not grow at anything like
the steady rate that Francis and other monetarists
advocated. They attributed wide swings in money
growth to the Fed’s strategy of targeting market
(i.e., nominal) interest rates. During World War II
and for several years afterward, Federal Reserve
open market operations were aimed primarily at
maintaining low and stable yields on U.S. Treasury
securities. The Federal Reserve–Treasury Accord
of 1951 removed the Fed’s obligation to maintain
ceilings on Treasury security yields, but both yields
and the general “condition” of the Treasury securi-
ties market remained important concerns of open
market policy. In particular, the Fed typically would
act to prevent market yields from changing when-
ever the Treasury issued new debt—a policy known
as maintaining an “even keel.”
The Fed used this “money market” strategy to
implement policy throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s. Francis was highly critical of the approach
because it detracted from his preferred policy of
stable growth of the money stock.26 Moreover, he
eschewed the use of market interest rates as a guide
for policy because their movement did not always
reflect policy actions. While rising interest rates
often were considered a sign of monetary policy
tightening, Francis noted that rising rates also could
reflect rising inflation, the outcome of an expansion-
ary monetary policy.
From the first FOMC meetings he attended,
Francis chided the Committee for previous policies
that, in his view, contributed to uncertainty over
the stance of policy. For example, at a meeting on
May 10, 1966, Francis observed that “There had
now been ten or eleven months when the directive
had continuously called for a moderation or restric-
tion of expansion in bank reserves, bank credit,
and money, and at the same time called for only
slightly firmer money market conditions. Those
instructions [have] been inconsistent…[and have
led to] very rapid increases in bank reserves, bank
credit and the money supply” (FOMC, May 10, 1966,
p. 49). He expressed this view often during the late
1960s, both at FOMC meetings and in public forums.
Speaking to a group of financial market practition-
ers in New York City in 1968, Francis argued that
“Measures of money market conditions such as
market interest rates and free reserves have been
shown to be poor indicators of the influence of
monetary actions.” And, “for stabilization purposes,
movements in interest rates should be viewed no
differently than movements in commodity prices”
(Francis, 1968, p. 8).
The FOMC never abandoned money market
conditions or interest rates as policy targets. In 1970,
however, FOMC policy directives began to include
specific targets for the growth of money and bank
credit, as well as for money market conditions.
Frequently the objectives for money and credit were
in conflict with those specified for interest rates,
and the latter were usually permitted to take prece-
dence. Citing such conflicts, Francis voted against
two policy directives in 1973 because he did not
believe that the monetary growth rates specified in
those directives—which he agreed with—would be
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26 Francis was not the first Federal Reserve Bank president to criticize
the money market approach. The president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Malcolm Bryan, argued against the approach in the
1950s in favor of targeting a monetary aggregate (Meigs, 1976; Hafer,
1999).
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directives also specified.27 The failure to achieve
the monetary growth objectives set by the FOMC
led Francis to argue for making public the FOMC’s
targets and its record of achieving those targets:
“The records should contain a clearer description
of the whole process of making and implementing
policy, including information on targets that were
missed and on those that were hit” (FOMC,
December 17, 1973, p. 14). 
In contrast to Francis, most FOMC members
were unwilling to discard interest rates or money
market conditions as proximate objectives for mone-
tary policy. Burns sometimes made statements at
FOMC meetings favoring tighter control of the
growth of monetary aggregates. He more frequently
spoke against monetarist policy prescriptions, how-
ever, both at FOMC meetings and in public com-
ments. For example, at an FOMC meeting in early
1971, Burns argued that “the heavy emphasis that
many people were placing on the behavior of M1
involved an excessively simplified view of monetary
policy” (FOMC, February 9, 1971, p. 87). And, in
congressional testimony in 1975, he stated: “There
is a school of thought that holds that the Federal
Reserve need pay no attention to interest rates, that
the only thing that matters is how this or that mone-
tary aggregate is behaving. We at the Federal Reserve
cannot afford the luxury of any such mechanical
rule…We pay close attention to interest rates
because of their profound effects on the working
of the economy” (Burns, 1978, p. 369).28
Supply Shocks
Francis’s policy views were shaped and sup-
ported by considerable empirical research conducted
by St. Louis Fed staff, as well as economists outside
the System. The St. Louis Fed formulated a simple,
yet highly accurate forecasting model and began to
publish forecasts in the Bank’s Review in April 1970
(Andersen and Carlson, 1970). Like other models,
however, the St. Louis model seriously under-forecast
inflation in 1973-74 and the decline in real econ-
omic activity in 1974-75. Burns noted this in testi-
mony before the House Committee on Banking and
Currency in July 1974: “Inflationary tendencies
and monetary expansion are not as closely related
as is sometimes imagined. For example, the econo-
metric model of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank,
which assigns a major role to growth of the money
stock in movements of the general price level, has
seriously underestimated the rate of inflation since
the beginning of 1973…Apparently, special factors…
have been at work” (Burns, 1978, p. 176).29
Francis acknowledged that “With respect to
inflation…the rise in prices in 1974 was just about
double the increase that he would have expected
to result from the policy actions that had been taken.
Special factors, such as the energy and agricultural
problems, had contributed to the rise in prices in
1974” (FOMC, December 17, 1974, p. 99). Francis
reiterated his earlier position  that observed changes
in the price level caused by changes in relative
prices associated with supply disturbances could
not persist indefinitely. As he had argued almost a
decade earlier, over time inflation was a monetary
phenomenon. In a speech in October 1974, for
example, he stated that he was “not willing to accept
the special factor explanation of inflation because
that explanation removes the focus from inflation
as a monetary phenomenon” (Francis, 1974, p. 5).
In policy discussions, Francis warned against
tightening excessively in response to a temporary
increase in the price level caused by supply shocks,
claiming that the special “factors would not continue
to exert strong upward pressure [on inflation] in
1975, and the rate of inflation would subside”
(FOMC, December 17, 1974, p. 99). At the same
time, however, he also warned against excessive
easing in response to the ongoing recession because
it too had been caused by the supply shocks and not
a lack of demand. At an FOMC meeting in January
1974, he argued that “the actual and prospective
slowdown in economic activity resulted wholly from
capacity, supply, and price-distorting constraints
and not from a weakening in demand. Therefore,
to ease policy and allow a faster rate of monetary
growth would be to increase inflationary pressures
without expanding real output or reducing unem-
ployment” (FOMC, January 22, 1974, p. 102). And,
in December of that year, he argued that “The cur-
rent decline in economic activity differed from past
recessions in a number of respects. First, it was
one of the few declines, if not the only one, to have
developed without having been preceded by stabi-
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27 See FOMC, July 17 and August 21, 1973.
28 Burns made this statement in testimony titled “Monetary Targets and
Credit Allocation” to the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy,
U.S. House Banking, Currency, and Housing Committee, February 6,
1975.lization policy actions that brought it about. Second,
there had been an absolute decline in the country’s
capacity to produce, caused by the agricultural and
energy problems, by the distortions resulting from
the wage and price controls, by the new environ-
mental and safety standards, and by changes in
foreign exchange rates” (FOMC, December 17, 1974,
p. 99). Rapid money stock growth, Francis argued,
could do little to affect the growth of real output or
employment in such a circumstance and would
result mainly in a higher rate of inflation.
CONCLUSION
Darryl Francis served as president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis during tumultuous econ-
omic times. Even so, Francis’s views about monetary
policy reflected an underlying set of beliefs from
which he did not waver. The “four basic premises”
that guided him in his policy prescriptions were set
out in an early speech and reprinted in the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review in 1968 (Francis,
1968). These premises are as follows: “First, a pre-
dominantly market orientation.” Francis firmly
believed in the unequaled efficiency of free markets
to allocate incomes and goods and services. “Second,
quantification is essential.” In contrast to most of
his FOMC colleagues, Francis consistently fought
for quantifiable policy rules and measures of the
success or failure of policy actions. “Third, our
economic system is more stable than was believed
a few years ago.” Francis believed that, over time,
real economic growth was determined by population
growth, capital formation, and technology. Monetary
policy, in his view, could not reliably improve on
market outcomes in the short run, or increase real
output growth (or lower the unemployment rate)
in the long run. Although not the accepted wisdom
in his time, such a view today is fundamental.
“Fourth, monetary management is more properly
directed toward influencing changes in total spend-
ing.” Francis questioned attempts to use monetary
or fiscal policies to affect specific markets or sectors
of the economy. Although actions taken to achieve
price stability could impinge more on some sectors
than on others, Francis argued that free markets
would adjust to such actions. Allocation of goods
and services or resources by market forces, he
believed, was preferable to allocation by government
decree.
Francis did not think about monetary policy in
terms of forward-looking, dynamic rules or deep
theoretical models. He had strong convictions about
the efficacy of market forces and the limitations of
government stabilization policies. Even though
Francis believed that monetary policy could exert a
powerful short-run impact on the unemployment
rate, he was convinced that it could not be used to
permanently steer the economy to any particular rate
of growth. In the long run, Francis believed that
monetary policy affected only the price level. Main-
taining price stability, Francis believed, would help
establish conditions that would foster maximum
employment and economic growth. Although not
widely shared among his contemporary Federal
Reserve colleagues, today such views are mainstream.
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